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Abstract
Background: Systems of governance play a key role in the operation and performance of health systems. In the
past six decades, China has made great advances in strengthening its health system, most notably in establishing a
health insurance system that enables residents of rural areas to achieve access to essential services. Although there
have been several studies of rural health insurance schemes, these have focused on coverage and service utilization,
while much less attention has been given to the role of governance in designing and implementing these schemes.
Methods: Information from publications and policy documents relevant to the development of two rural
health insurance policies in China was obtained, analysed, and synthesise. 92 documents on CMS (Cooperative
Medical Scheme) or NCMS (New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme) from four databases searched were
included. Data extraction and synthesis of the information were guided by a framework that drew on that
developed by the WHO to describe health system governance and leadership.
Results: We identified a series of governance practices that were supportive of progress, including the prioritisation by
the central government of health system development and certain health policies within overall national development;
strong government commitment combined with a hierarchal administrative system; clear policy goals coupled with
the ability for local government to adopt policy measures that take account of local conditions; and the accumulation
and use of the evidence generated from local practices. However these good practices were not seen in all
governance domains. For example, poor collaboration between different government departments was shown
to be a considerable challenge that undermined the operation of the insurance schemes.
Conclusions: China’s success in achieving scale up of CMS and NCMS has attracted considerable interest in
many low and middle income countries (LMICs), especially with regard to the schemes’ designs, coverage,
and funding mechanisms. However, this study demonstrates that health systems governance may be critical
to enable the development and operation of such schemes. Given that many LMICs are expanding health
financing system to cover populations in rural areas or the informal sectors, we argue that strengthening
specific practices in each governance domain could inform the adaptation of these schemes to other settings.
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Background
There is increasing evidence that health system govern-
ance is critical to health systems operation and overall
performance [1, 2]. Experience from a range of countries
suggests that governance has been a driver of success in
countries, achieving major advances in health and access
to care compared to others at a similar level of wealth
[3]. Health system governance is shaped by the wider
governance framework within the country; however
there are indications that governance in the health sys-
tems is a strong independent determinant of health sys-
tem effectiveness and its capacity to achieve its goals [1].
Despite recognising the centrality of governance within
health systems, there is a considerable lack of clarity as
to what it means vis-a-vis other core functions (‘building
blocks’) of the health system. Whether governance is
one of the key ‘building blocks’ or a cross-cutting func-
tion underlying all other health system functions is a
matter for debate.
Importantly, the precise mechanisms through which
good or poor governance affects health systems goals
(health, financial protection, responsiveness and im-
proved efficiency) are still insufficiently understood. Ac-
cording to the WHO, the concept of leadership and
governance “involves ensuring strategic policy frame-
works exist and are combined with effective oversight,
coalition building, regulation, attention to system design
and accountability” [4, 5]. This concept focuses on the
stewardship role of the government in governing and
managing health care, and coordinating other actors en-
gaged in health policy formulation and its implementa-
tion. Other definitions have looked beyond the role of
the government, defining governance as the activities
through which a society organizes itself to achieve health
of populations [6, 7]. Under an effectively governed
health system, the policy goals that are set are more
likely to be translated into policies and activities that
bring benefits to the population, including otherwise
excluded groups; policies are more likely to be well de-
signed; and the governments are better able to plan,
manage, regulate and implement them [2].
In the last six decades, China has made significant ad-
vances in health system strengthening and improving
health outcomes, despite suffering setbacks including
political and socio-economic crises. The development of
a health insurance system for rural residents has been an
important means of expanding access to essential care.
The new rural cooperative medical scheme (NCMS) in
China was established in 2003, as a flagship policy aimed
at rural populations. It expanded rapidly, with coverage
increasing from 9.5% to 98.9% of rural residents in
2003-2013 [8]. Achievements include extending insur-
ance coverage and improving access to health care for
rural residents in China—a group that has previously
had only limited access to often rudimentary health
care—and alleviating the financial burden associated with
seeking care [9]. The NCMS builds on earlier experience
with the national cooperative medical system (CMS),
which was created in the 1950s and expanded to cover
90% of villages in less than 20 years [10]. These successive
schemes were seen as major contributors to the process
of health system strengthening, supplementing and en-
abling other key policies such as the three-tier service
delivery model (an extensive and integrated network
consisting of health service facilities at county, town-
ship and village level linking primary health care with
higher levels of care) [11]. Despite differences in their
structures and processes, the two schemes have many
similarities in terms of policy formulation and imple-
mentation, especially featuring the policy innovation
and rapid scale up. Though there has been considerable
attention by researchers to the impact of the rural
health insurance schemes on coverage and service
utilization [12, 13], the role of governance—within the
schemes, and of the broader health system—in design-
ing and implementing these initiatives, has received
limited attention. Specifically, the governance processes
underpinning the formulation and implementation of
the two health insurance schemes, as well as the path-
ways through which governance has promoted positive
outcomes are insufficiently explored. This represents a
considerable gap in knowledge, hampering efforts to
understand how the schemes have achieved many of
their objectives and what governance features may be
needed for their implementation. Filling this gap will
provide evidence that is relevant to other low and middle
income countries (LMICs) considering similar strategies.
In this paper, we explore these two policies through
the lens of governance: a) we identify the governance
policies and practices that have underpinned and shaped
these two initiatives and enabled them to benefit from
innovation and rapid implementation nationally, b) we
assess the extent to which these governance practices
conformed to the criteria for good governance as con-
ceptualised by WHO and others, with relevance to gov-
ernance structures, processes and relationships that
promote health system strengthening, c) we then explain
what common features of governance, operationalised
through a specific set of functions, may have supported
the implementation and performance of the two key na-
tional policies (CMS and NCMS), and identifying lessons
for low and middle income countries (LMICs).
Methods
We reviewed information from publications on the
development of two rural health insurance policies in
China. The information was identified, extracted, ar-
ranged and analysed according to the WHO framework
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for health system governance (Table 1) [5, 6], which in-
cludes six dimensions: policy guidance and vision, sys-
tem design, regulation and management capacity,
accountability and transparency, intelligence and over-
sight, collaboration and coalition building. Within each
function, supportive (good) governance should manifest
as [5]: 1) a clear positioning and health policy vision, 2)
explicit and systematic policy design and implementa-
tion strategy, 3) appropriately designed regulations or in-
centives aligned with policy objectives, 4) effective
supervision and accountability mechanisms established
to support implementation, 5) evidence-informed policy
design and scientific oversight on implementation of
health policy, and 6) coordination and collaboration
among different sectors.
Search strategy
First, we reviewed the literature systematically, including
four electronic databases (PubMed, Proquest Dissertation
& Theses Database, China National Knowledge Infrastruc-
ture (CHKD-CNKI) and Chinese Medicine Premier
(Wanfang Data) containing publications in English or
Chinese without limitations on the publication date. The
websites of the China Health and Family Planning Com-
mittee, WHO, and the World Bank were also searched.
The search strategy and terms in English and Chinese are
Table 1 Health system governance functions and the specific attributes to be analysed for each domain
Governance domain Features of good governance [5, 6] Specific questions
Policy guidance and vision Formulating sector strategies and also
specific technical policies; defining goals,
directions and spending priorities across
services; identifying the roles of public,
private and voluntary actors and the role
of civil society.
Any long term health plans/development goals/any documents?
Role of “Health” in overall country development?
Any other technical plans or strategies for this policy?
Are goals and priorities clearly defined in the policy strategies?
Are the policy strategies and designs comprehensive?
Who initiated the policy (e.g. central government, departments
and its level, individual, or media)?
Why initiated the policy (e.g. problems targeted, or high level will)?
System design Ensuring a fit between strategy and
structure and reducing duplication
and fragmentation.
Is the specific health policy related to overall health or national
development plan?
To what extend the system structure responds to what needs to
happen in this policy?
Design of interventions and policies to deliver services
Are the duplication and fragmentation reduced?
Regulation and management
capacity
Designing regulations and incentives
and ensuring they are fairly enforced.
How the policy is operationalized (e.g. regulation, contract or legal)?
How to ensure the different levels of government accountable to
the policy aims (e.g. supervision, promotion of leader)?
How administrative structure is organized and contribute to the
enforcement of policy (e.g. duties allocation, reporting to higher
authority)
What regulations or incentive to ensure the implementation?
How to ensure the management capacity of different levels of
governments (e.g. selection, training, supervision)
Accountable and transparent Ensuring all health system actors are
held publicly accountable. Transparency
is required to achieve real accountability.
How to ensure the health policy be responsive the priority of
health problems at that time?
How the different levels of governments adopt policies based on
the needs of local residents?
Is the performance of health authorities or health providers
transparent to the public?
Is the finance situation of health authorities or health providers
or health insurance fund transparent to the public?
Intelligence and oversight Ensuring generation, analysis and use of
intelligence on trends and differentials in
inputs, service access, coverage, safety; on
responsiveness, financial protection and
health outcomes; on the effects of policies
and reforms; on the political environment
and opportunities for action; and on policy
options.
What is the basis for policy design and contents? Is evidence
underpinning policy design?
How are pilots evaluated? How are the local experience and
lessons formulated and disseminated?
What monitoring and evaluation systems are in place?
How the monitoring and evaluation contribute to policy?
Collaboration and coalition
building
Across sectors in government and with
actors outside government, including civil
society, to influence action on key
determinants of health and access to health
services; to generate support for public policies,
and to keep the different parts connected -
so called ‘joined up government.
How actors work across different sectors on design and
implementation of policy?
How are different actors mobilized to contribute to health
activities?
How is the collaboration with civil society organizations or
other (outside the formal health sector)?
How are the different levels of government collaborating?
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listed in Table 2. Historical policy documents were
obtained from the archives of the China Health and
Family Planning Committee and other ministries hold-
ing relevant information. We also obtained advice from
experts in health system strengthening and rural health
care in China to identify additional relevant research
papers, Ph.D. dissertations, reports, and policy and ad-
ministrative documents.
Inclusion criteria
We aimed to include all studies analysing the govern-
ance backgrounds of two policies, NCMS and CMS, but
very few studies focused primarily on governance as-
pects of NCMS or CMS. To obtain sufficient informa-
tion related to the study objectives, we included all
articles describing or analysing the detailed process of
designing and implementing NCMS and CMS, and then
extracted information related to health system govern-
ance. The judgement of relevance to health system gov-
ernance was based on WHO’s definition on governance
and its functions (Table 1) [4, 5]. The leadership and
governance of health systems adopted in this study re-
fers to role of the government in guiding and overseeing
the health system as a whole, and its relation to other
actors in all activities related to health. These were ap-
plied using a framework comprising six key functions
common to all health systems [4.5] (Table 1). Given that
the study did not seek to quantify outcomes, but to en-
sure that all relevant information relevant to the role of
governance, even if implicit, is included, the study in-
cluded not only peer-reviewed papers but also policy
documents, commentaries, viewpoints, project reports
and policy documents. There were no restrictions on
study design and methods in order to capture compre-
hensively all sources providing information relevant to
governance factors or practices. We did not assess risk
of bias of the studies included as our goal was not to as-
sess the impact of governance and all publications were
appraised in terms of significance, level of detail and
relevance to the research questions.
Two of the authors (LH and BW) independently
screened the abstracts and titles, and discussed disagree-
ments with the lead author to achieve consensus. The
lead author (BY) screened all the full texts and another
co-author (WJ) checked the all full texts in order to en-
sure no important documents were missed. Based on
these criteria, we screened 9313 titles and abstracts,
found from both databases and references tracing, and
Table 2 Search strategy
Databases searched Search terms
PubMed (Search date: 8 March 2016) #1:politics[MH] OR governance[TIAB]OR “policy making”[TIAB] OR “policy-making”[TIAB] OR
“policymaker”[TIAB] OR “policy makers”[TIAB] OR “policy-maker”[TIAB] OR “policy-makers”[TIAB] OR
decision-maker[TIAB] OR decision-makers[TIAB] OR decentralization [TIAB] OR decentralized[TIAB] OR
recentralization[TIAB] OR centralization[TIAB] OR administrator[TIAB] OR administrators[TIAB] OR government
[TIAB] OR governments[TIAB] OR regulation[TIAB] OR regulations[TIAB] OR stakeholder[TIAB] OR
stakeholders[TIAB] OR responsiveness[TIAB] OR accountability[TIAB]
#2: health[TIAB]
#3: China[MH] OR China[TIAB] OR CMS[TIAB] OR NCMS[TIAB] OR NRCMS[TIAB] OR “New Rural Cooperative
Medical System”[TIAB] OR “health system reform” [TIAB] OR “healthcare reform” [TIAB]
Proquest (Search date: 8 March 2016) ((ti(politics OR governance OR "policy making" OR "policy-making" OR "policy maker" OR "policy makers"
OR "policy-maker" OR "policy-makers" OR decisionmaker OR "decision making" OR "decision makings" OR
decisionmakers OR decentralization OR decentralisation OR decentralized OR decentralised OR
recentralization OR recentralisation OR centralization OR centralisation OR administrator OR administrators
OR government OR governments OR regulation OR regulations OR stakeholder OR stakeholders OR
responsiveness OR accountability OR equity OR inequity OR inequities OR leadership) AND (ti(CMS OR
NCMS OR NRCMS OR "Cooperative Medical System" OR "New Rural Cooperative Medical System" OR
"health insurance" OR "health system reform" OR "healthcare reform" OR "Patriotic Health Campaign") OR
ti(health AND reform))) OR (ab(politics OR governance OR "policy making" OR "policy-making" OR "policy
maker" OR "policy makers" OR "policy-maker" OR "policy-makers" OR decisionmaker OR "decision making"
OR "decision makings" OR decisionmakers OR decentralization OR decentralisation OR decentralized OR
decentralised OR recentralization OR recentralisation OR centralization OR centralisation OR administrator
OR administrators OR government OR governments OR regulation OR regulations OR stakeholder OR
stakeholders OR responsiveness OR accountability OR equity OR inequity OR inequities OR leadership)
AND (ab(CMS OR NCMS OR NRCMS OR "Cooperative Medical System" OR "New Rural Cooperative
Medical System" OR "health insurance" OR "health system reform" OR "healthcare reform" OR "Patriotic
Health Campaign") OR ab(health AND reform)))) AND (ti(China) OR ab(China) OR diskw(China) OR
su(China) OR au(China) OR sch(China))
China National Knowledge Infrastructure
(CHKD-CNKI) (Search date: 8 March 2016)
(主题 =治理 +管理 +分权 +集权 +政府 +规定 +规则 +规划 +利益相关者 + ((设计 +执行 +制
定)NEAR (方案 +政策 +制度))) AND (主题 =医疗 +健康 +卫生 +合作医疗 +新农合 +新医改)
Chinese Medicine Premier (Wanfang Data)
(Search date: 8 March 2016)
(题名:(“治理”+”管理”+”设计”+”执行”+”制定”+”分权” + "方案”+”政策”+”政治”+”政府”+”规则”+”利益相关
者”))*(题名:(”合作医疗”+”新农合”+”新型农村合作医疗”+”爱国卫生”+”新医改”+”医疗卫生体制改
革”+”卫生体系”+”卫生系统”))
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retrieved 729 potentially relevant publications. We then
examined the full texts of these papers for relevance and
scope of information related to any governance dimen-
sions. Finally, 92 papers or documents on CMS or
NCMS containing information closely related to the
study objectives were selected for data extraction and
analysis. The materials we included were published or
issued between 1960 and 2016.
Data extraction and synthesis
Data extraction and analysis was guided by a conceptual
framework for functions of health system governance
(Table 1) drawing on the WHO’s framework on health
system governance and leadership and Siddiqi’s frame-
work for assessing health system governance [1, 4, 5].
Though there is no blueprint for effective governance
and leadership that is universally applicable, the assump-
tion underlying the framework was that certain govern-
ment behaviours and practices, categorised within each
of the six key domains of governance, are associated
with well-functioning health systems.
Each of these governance domains was then operatio-
nalised in specific questions (sub-domains) by a multi-
disciplinary international expert group collaborating on
a lager project to synthesise the experience of China in
health system development and lessons for other coun-
tries undergoing similar developments. This involved an
initial face-to-face workshop, followed by virtual inter-
action to refine the framework after the initial stages of
analysis. For each domain and each question under these
domains, the governance-related policies and practices af-
fecting the design and operation of the two insurance
schemes (NCMS and CMS) were extracted and described.
The criteria for supportive or good governance were
also drawn from the WHO’ analysis on the features of
governance arrangements in the well-developed and per-
forming health systems. Good governance is a fluid con-
cept, often referred to but rarely explicitly defined. The
framework of Siddiqi [1] and UNDP [14] emphasised
relational principles of governance including: inclusion
of and valuing the views of different stakeholders and
seeking consensus, in addition to strategic vision and
other conventional attributes. The WHO model implicitly
defines good health system governance as the presence of
progressive policies and actions in each governance do-
main under the oversight of the government acting legit-
imately on behalf of the population, while their absence is
associated with governance failure [4].
We analysed and synthesised the extracted data using
a framework synthesis approach [15, 16]. The rationale
for using this synthesis method is that given the large
amount of textual data extracted from primary studies,
it represents a highly-structured approach to organising
and analysing data. Thus, emerging governance issues
related to the formulation and implementation of the
two health insurance schemes (NCMS and CMS) were
categorized and matched against each domain and sub-
domain of the framework, allowing new attributes to
emerge. The attributes were then synthesised and reor-
ganised hierarchically, for example to identify related
and divergent attributes, and governance factors related
to an overarching governance domain. Some of the gov-
ernance attributes in the frameworks were not supported
by evidence. Two senior health system researchers with
specialist knowledge in this area, and two policymakers
who were involved in the process of the design and im-
plementation of the CMS or NCMS, were asked to sug-
gest additional sources relevant to the newly emerging
themes and to validate the analysis, drawing on their
appraisal of the studies. This was required due to the
specific characteristics of governance in China, in the
health sector and beyond, where the lack of evidence on
particular governance-related aspects could be a sig-
nificant finding in itself. Finally, practices exhibiting
characteristics of good governance were identified and
synthesised.
Findings
We first briefly describe the development and character-
istics of two rural health insurance policies (CMS and
NCMS), summarised from the literature and policy doc-
uments and using the conventional functions of a health
insurance scheme. The governance practices underpin-
ning these two policies in each governance domain are
then analysed against the criteria for supportive health
system governance.
The development of health insurance system in rural China
After the People’s Republic of China was established in
1949, rural residents had to pay out-of-pocket to obtain
care, and there was no consistent, nationally-agreed
strategy for how to reduce the financial burden on the
population [10]. With the formation and rapid develop-
ment of the collective economy (the collective owner-
ship of land and other property) in rural areas, the
collective fund in each commune started to expand its
finance pool to include health care. In 1955, the earliest
form of a Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) appeared
in Gaoping County, Shanxi Province [17]. Its coverage
increased rapidly after 1955, from 10% of villages in
1958 to 46% of villages in 1962 [18]. Between 1962 and
1967, further development of the cooperative medical
scheme stopped and coverage declined markedly, coin-
ciding with a slowdown in development of collective
economic [10]. Since 1969, the coverage of cooperative
medical scheme restarted, grew rapidly and achieved its
peak, whereby 94.4% of village residents were covered
by the CMS in 1976 [19].
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After 1978, CMS coverage started to decline, mainly
because its economic and structural foundations started
to change. The economic system in rural areas started to
shift towards a household-responsibility system. For ex-
ample, land previously collectively owned was trans-
ferred to being operated by families under the contract
with collectives, which reduced the incentive for house-
holds to contribute to a community fund intended for
CMS. Between the 1980s and the late 1990s, many pilots
projects continued, seeking to re-establish the CMS,
while there was also a number of studies on how to design
the health financing system in rural China [20]. These
pilots were conducted by at different levels of govern-
ment, by officials, researchers, or residents, consistent
with a trend to increasing decentralisation. Though
most of these pilots and studies confirmed that the co-
operative insurance system was superior to private
health insurance or user fees, these did not lead to new
initiatives to extent insurance coverage in rural China.
The CMS was increasingly marginalised; by 1998 only
6.5% of rural residents in China were covered by co-
operative schemes [21].
Given that, by the late 1990s, more than 90% of rural
residents lacked health insurance coverage, the large
burden of untreated illnesses contributed to poverty in
rural areas. The situation became very serious by the
end of the 1990s: a study of 114 poverty-stricken coun-
ties from 1993 to 2000 [10] found that family bankrupt-
cies due to medical expenses accounted for a third of
rural poverty. The World Health Organization report
2000, ranked China’s health system at among the worst
in terms of fairness of health care financing [22]. The
resulting publicity, and subsequent debates raised the
affordability of care high on the policy agenda; health
financing for rural residents started to be perceived as a
serious need by the policy makers [23]. In a parallel
development, accelerated economic growth since 1978
increased resources available at different levels of gov-
ernment, and provided the financial basis for the re-
building of the CMS [10]. Consequently, in 2002, the
central government (national level government) of
China published a strategy setting out the objectives
and parameters of the new insurance scheme [24].
Since then, the NCMS coverage started to grow rapidly.
By 2008, 98.17% of rural village counties had estab-
lished NCMS, and 91.05% of rural residents were cov-
ered by the new health insurance scheme; by 2013, the
coverage of rural populations was nearly universal, at
98.9% [8].
The contents of cooperative medical scheme in its
different stages
Table 3 compares the features of the two insurance
schemes during the different historical stages.
Fund collection
For both CMS and NCMS, the eligible populations are
those registered as rural residents in China, both
employed and non-employed [25]. In both schemes, en-
rolment of rural residents is voluntary. Under the trad-
itional CMS, that was in place from 1949 to 1978, funds
were collected from public sources, such as from agri-
cultural cooperatives, revenues from village clinics, and
premiums from rural residents [10]. The premiums col-
lected from rural residents were flat rate, for example
in Masheng County the premium for each person was
¥ 1.5 to 2 (about $0.21 to $0.29 at 2016 exchange
rate) per year in 1966 [26]. From 1979 to 2002, the
existing CMS was financed from different sources,
including from the collective funds generated by the
village community, household premiums, or subsidies
from county and town level governments [27]. Since
Table 3 Characteristics of the cooperative medical scheme over time
1955–1978 CMS 1979–1996 Collapse period 2003-present NCMS
Fund collection • Voluntary enrolment
• Public welfare fund from
agricultural cooperatives
• Flat-raged premium from enrolees
• Revenue of village clinics
Only few areas still had traditional CMS,
and some researches or government
policy pilots applied other kinds of health
insurance in few areas. In most areas of
rural China, no any health insurance system.
• Voluntary enrolment
• Subsidy from different levels of government
• Flat-rated premium from enrolees
Risk pooling • Pooled at the village brigade level
• In few cases, pooled at township
level
• Pooled at county level
• In some areas, pooled at municipality level
Benefit package • Based on the fund level, firstly
coverage preventive and
outpatient services in village
clinics;
• Some areas partly covered referred
hospital outpatient visits and
referred hospitalization.
• Provider payment is not clear.
• Covering both outpatient and inpatient
services in different level of health care
facilities (with different co-payment levels)
• Catastrophic diseases are also partly covered.
• Provider payment methods include fee-for-
service, capitation and case-based payments
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2003, when the NCMS was established, it has been
funded from subsidies by different levels of govern-
ment and individual contributions [24]. In NCMS the
premiums collected from rural residents were also flat
rated, and have increased from ¥10 ($1.45) per year
in 2003 to on average ¥490 ($14.2) in 2015 [25].
Risk pooling
In most areas the CMS funds were pooled at the village
level (the lowest administrative level in China is village,
followed by township, county, municipal, principal and
country level, as the highest level), and only in a few
cases the pools expanded to include the township level
[10]. In contrast, the NCMS risk pooling was at the
county level [24] (there were 2852 rural counties in
2012, with an average population of 300,000 in one
county) [25].
Benefit package
The benefit package of CMS included preventive health
services, free consultation at the village clinic, free or
partly covered drugs at the village clinic and, in a few
areas, the CMS also partly covered referred state-owned
hospital visits and hospitalization [27]. The NCMS bene-
fit package was more comprehensive, covering out-
patient and inpatient services in different levels of state-
owned health care facilities (including village clinic,
township health centres, county hospital and tertiary
hospitals in municipal and principal levels), as well as
catastrophic diseases with different co-payment levels
[13]. Fee-for-service was the main mechanism for paying
health care providers applied by the NCMS, however in
recent years, some areas started to pilot capitation and
case-based payments [28, 29].
Governance factors underpinning the design and
implementation process of CMS and NCMS
This section synthesises the study findings related to
governance aspects and supportive factors relevant to
the implementation and operation of CMS and NCMS.
These are structured under the six key governance
domains following the conceptual framework underpinning
this study (Table 4).
Policy guidance and vision
WHO’ framework of health system governance envisages
the presence of clear vision of policy aims and priorities
for development, accompanied by explicit guidance on
how to plan and design policy [4].
CMS
In 1951, the third year after the founding of the People’s
Republic of China, the central government formulated an
overall health sector development strategy: prevention-
oriented, utilization of both traditional Chinese and western
medicine, combined health work and mass mobilization
to ensure accessibility of health services to most of the
Chinese population, with priority given to workers,
peasants and soldiers [30]. Under this strategy, health
sector development in rural areas became a priority for
decision makers, which could explain why, although the
central government initially had no nationally-agreed
policy for health insurance system for rural residents,
evidence of the achievements of the CMS in some areas
encouraged it to promote the rapid expansion of CMS
to the whole country. It was reported that, in 1955,
when the prototype CMS scheme was implemented in
Gaoping County, the central government sent the vice-
minister of the Ministry of Health to visit the county
and investigate its operation [31]. The priority given to
this scheme across different levels of government was
apparent from the publication of numerous regulations to
enable its wider implementation. In June 1956, just one
year after the first CMS appeared, the First National
People’s Congress passed “Advanced Agricultural Produc-
tion Cooperatives Demonstration Rules” which stipulated
that the collective economy should take responsibility for
health care of rural residents [10].
The government also sought to provide technical guid-
ance to the lower levels of government on policy design.
The guidance was in the form of central government is-
suing official documents in a top-down manner, but the
guidance was brief and summarized the typical policy
design of the scheme in particular areas. For example,
the key guidance document was the “Report on the Na-
tional Health Work Conference in Jishan County” and
its appendix “Opinions on People’s Communes Health
Work” issued in 1960, and this guidance was based on
CMS experience in Jishan County and other areas that
were quick to implement the scheme [10]. By analysing
the contents of these documents, it was found that the
guidance tried to define the roles of different actors:
the individual and commune having responsibility in fi-
nancing CMS; the residents, health workers and local
government officers having right in supervising the
fund of CMS; and different levels of health providers in
charge of providing health care [27]. This served to
demonstrate who should be responsible to design and
implement the CMS.
“The design of Collective Health Care System (CMS
in Qishan County): commune members pay a certain
amount of health care fee one year, and they could
just pay consultation fee or drug fee when they seek
for health care. The commune should subsidise for
this system……. Under the leadership of the commune,
the health workers, village committee and residents’
representatives should form a management committee
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of Collective Health Care System. And this committee
is in charge of formulating the specific management
regulations.” (From the policy document “Opinions
on People’s Communes Health Work”, 1960) [27].
NCMS
Since the introduction of a market economy in China
after 1978, economic development has become a core
priority for government and other actors at sub-national
level. Health system development was not seen as a pri-
ority at that time. There was a constant tension between
safeguarding people’s health and pursuing economic
growth, with the latter dominating the activities of many
health care providers. The traditional CMS started to
collapse in most areas of China and no alternative finan-
cial protection schemes replace them. This meant that
rural residents experienced a heavy financial burden
from ill health, with people complaining that it is “hard
and expensive to see a doctor” and the cost of seeking
care gradually became a serious social problem [32].
When policy makers eventually realised the seriousness
of this problem, from the end of 1990s [28], central gov-
ernment again began to focus their attention on the
development of the health system. In 1997, the central
government issued “Decision of Health Reform and De-
velopment” which explicitly stated the vision on health
system development, namely that population health
must be an important goal of national development, and
public finance support for the health system must be se-
cured. While simultaneously recognising other existing
health system problems, government took the develop-
ment of NCMS as the start of the reform, and from
2003 NCMS became a priority policy specially promoted
by the government.
Some government practices reveal the priority given to
the NCMS within the country development agenda.
Firstly, the development of a health insurance system in
rural China was added to the national development plan.
In the ninth Five-Year National Economic and Social
Development Plan (issued in 1996), the goal regarding
the cooperative medical system was quite specific “to
expand coverage of the cooperative medical system to
50% until 2000s.” Then, in October 2002, the central
government issued the document “Decision on Further
Strengthening of Rural Health Work”, and confirmed
the public subsidy that would support the development
of New Rural Cooperative Medical System [10].
NCMS was also implemented with a clear policy guid-
ance issued from central government. Before the imple-
mentation of NCMS, central government issued “Opinions
on Establishing a New Rural Cooperative Medical System”
in 2003, and this document included all principles for
designing and implementing NCMS to guide lower level
governments, including the lowest standard for premium
level and subsidy level, fund management regulations,
health services packages covered, and services quality man-
agement. In this technical guidance document, the roles of
different actors involved in managing or supervising
NCMS were also clearly defined [24].
Systematic design
An effective health policy should build or adjust its
health care delivery system and organizational structure
in order to enable the implementation and fulfilling the
aims of this policy; in other words, the system design
should be fit for purpose. In addition, duplication and
fragmentation should be avoided [4].
CMS
The analysis of policy documents [26, 27] demonstrates
that policy makers involved in the CMS were aware that
CMS could not function well without corresponding ac-
cessible and well managed delivery system, thus the policy
guidance document notes that CMS should make a full
use of the three-tier health delivery system in rural
areas and trained barefoot doctors, to provide services.
The three-tier health providers were the only health
providers in rural China during that period, and both
the CMS and three-tier health delivery system were
under the supervision and management of the govern-
ment. Therefore, the CMS’s design and implementation
did not involve arrangements on how CMS can select
and contract with health providers.
The CMS design did not involve building new man-
agement departments, and in most areas the CMS fund
was not managed by a separate department, but by the
agricultural production cooperatives, who were also in
charge of managing economic production and welfare
issues in a village [31].
NCMS
Compared with the CMS, the NCMS system design
was specified in a more systematic manner, and an
organizational structure was formed to support the
NCMS fund management and policy operation. The
management system includes three parts. The NCMS
coordinating work team is composed of all relevant
government departments (Health, Finance, Agriculture,
and Civil Affairs), and its responsibility is to design and
adjust the NCMS scheme. The NCMS management office
is in charge of the operation of NCMS. Its management
committee is composed of all relevant government depart-
ments and rural residents’ representatives, and the com-
mittee is in charge of supervision of NCMS performance
and fund management [24]. To reduce the duplication
and contain management costs, the NCMS management
office is located within the structure of the health adminis-
tration department.
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There was also a recognition that NCMS could not
operate effectively without strengthening of other health
system components. The NCMS guidance document
[23] included recommended action for further strength-
ening of the health delivery system in rural areas as an
important policy component. One source also men-
tioned that in the process of NCMS expansion, the Min-
istry of Health made significant efforts to negotiate with
Ministry of Finance and the National Development and
Reform Commission, who are in charge of the country’s
financial investment in primary health facilities and
other aspects of health system strengthening [11]. In the
national policy guidance document, there was a general
directive that local government should choose health
providers based on their performance [19], but with no
specific advice on how to achieve this in practice. Con-
tracting was also not common, and there were few con-
tracts between health providers and NCMS in the early
phase of the scheme. In recent years, with the improve-
ment of the NCMS design, purchasing mechanisms
seeking to influence the behaviour of health providers in
terms of the quality and cost of health services that are
provided, became more sophisticated, involving adminis-
trative reviews and appraisals of health providers seeking
to provide certain services to NCMS patients, supervi-
sion of their performance, further development of the
payment methods to include performance-related pay-
ment and formal contracting of providers [33, 34].
“To strengthen the rural health delivery network, and
strengthen the management of rural health care
providers in order to improve the quality of health
services provided to rural residents……. Local
government need to select the designated health care
providers for NCMS based on their performance, and
should enhance the supervision on the health care
providers. The guideline on diagnosis and treatment
should be improved to enhance service quality,
efficiency and control cost.” (From policy document
“Opinions on Establishing a New Rural Cooperative
Medical System”, 2003) [19]
Regulation and management capacity
In order to ensure the effective implementation of health
policy, it is expected that a supportive governance system
should introduce appropriate regulations and incentive
mechanisms to influence the behaviour of government
officials, managers and other relevant actors [4].
CMS
The administrative system of China was highly hierarch-
ical, and under this governance system policies were
implemented in a top-down manner, with the higher ad-
ministrative levels forwarding the regulations and policy
implementation targets to the lower administrative
levels. As Fig. 1 shows [35], the first sharp increase in
coverage of CMS was at the end of the 1950s, and the
most important regulations and rules were all issued
during that period. The first regulation was issued in
1956, as noted above, the “Advanced Agricultural Produc-
tion Cooperatives Demonstration Rules”. In November
1959, the national health work conference was held in
Jishan County, Shanxi Province, during which the “Report
on the National Health Work Conference in Jishan
County” and its appendix “Opinions on People’s Com-
munes Health Work” were presented and enacted [36].
The effectiveness of top-down regulations or targets
on policy implementation was more pronounced if the
document was endorsed at the higher level of decision
making. For CMS, the strong political will by the highest
leader, Mao Zedong, to promote the expansion of CMS
was the most important driving force behind the rapid
implementation of the newly enacted regulations and
rapidly increasing coverage of CMS. In 1950s China just
entered into peace after a long term war, the personal
charisma of Chairman Mao Zedong was established in
the long war history, and his advocating and emphasis
Fig. 1 The percentage of villages covered by CMS and NCMS
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on improving the health system was a very effective im-
petus for the implementation of health policies and par-
ticularly those related to the CMS. One month after the
enactment of the above mentioned two guidance docu-
ments, in March 1960, Mao Zedong personally drafted
“Instructions on Health Work” and emphasized that “the
Central Committee of the Communist Party dictates that
the first Secretary of different levels of the communist
party committees should lead CMS work and make sure
the two documents are forwarded to each people’s com-
mune” [37]. Two years after this decree, the coverage of
CMS showed its first cycle of rapid increase. The next
round of promotion of CMS from the higher political
echelon, demonstrating political will, began in 1968.
One report analysing the experience of CMS at the
Leyuan Commune, Hubei Province, was commended
and advocated by Mao Zedong [10], which resulted in a
second period of rapid increase of CMS coverage at the
end of 1960s.
“In the Zhangye District, Gansu Province, at that
time, the CMS work was the first responsibility of
the highest leader, the CMS work was emphasized
at different kinds of meetings, and two large-scale
health work meetings each year were held to discuss
the CMS work.”(An interview cited from a literature) [38]
Another way commonly applied to foster the CMS
policy implementation in China was to strengthen the
advocacy in relation to the scheme, channelled through
the government media, whose viewpoints directly reflected
the central government’s political strategy. In 1958, an art-
icle (“Introduction to the experience of CMS”) highlighting
the importance of the scheme was published in Health
Newspaper, run by the Ministry of Health [10]. From
December 1968 to August 1976, People’s Daily, the
Chinese Communist Party newspaper, published a column
dedicated to discussing CMS in 107 issues [27], which
reflected the sustained interest of high level policymakers
in CMS and to keep in on the public radar.
Local governments’ capacity on design and manage-
ment of CMS was also crucial for advancing the im-
plementation of the CMS to the entire country. The
practice of the Chinese government was to encourage
local governments to learn from the experiences of
other provinces and regions; the ability to identify
and learn lessons was facilitated by the relatively uni-
form basic structures and organisational patterns. For
example, following the experience of CMS of the
Leyuan Commune, Hubei Province, was reported in
the People’s Daily, more than 50,000 visitors from dif-
ferent provinces visited Leyuan Commune from 1968
to 1976 to gain understanding of the local CMS im-
plementation model [39].
NCMS
The establishment and development of the NCMS was
included in the 1978 “Constitution of the People’s Re-
public of China” enacted by the Fifth National People’s
Congress, in which the third chapter states that “the gov-
ernment should develop social insurance, social welfare,
free medical services, and cooperative medical schemes
in order to ensure the labourers’ health right” [10]. Then
in 2003, the coverage of the NCMS in rural areas was
also written into the new “Agriculture Law” [10]. “Peo-
ple’s Republic of China Social Insurance Act” was passed
in 2011 and regulated that government should establish
and improve the NCMS for rural residents.
According to the above laws stating the basic require-
ment for the development of NCMS, the NCMS contin-
ued to develop and being implemented in a top-down
manner. In 2002, when the central government decided
to promote NCMS as a priority policy, the first action
was that China’s top leaders frequently discussed and
referred to it in different events, emphasising that the
government could do more in the area of rural health
care. On October 19, 2002, the central government is-
sued the “Decision on Further Strengthening of Rural
Health Work” which explicitly mentioned that “until
2010, the New Rural Cooperative Medical System will
cover all rural residents; and in order to achieve this ob-
jective, governments would subsidize NCMS since 2003.”
[24] In order to formally launch the NCMS, on October
29 2002, the China National Rural Health Conference
was held in Beijing. At this conference, the central gov-
ernment formally announced the establishment of
NCMS as a major national policy to be supported in
the near future. In accordance with the hierarchical ad-
ministration system, all these decisions and actions by
the central government serve to explicitly release the
information to different levels of government and other
relevant sectors (e.g.agriculture) that the implementa-
tion of NCMS should be a priority on their agenda. As
a result, different levels of government responded to
the request by the central government, and NCMS
entered in a period of rapid and well documented
expansion throughout China [40, 41].
In order to strengthen the implementation of NCMS,
the coverage of the scheme became a performance
indicator for NCMS managers, and achieving and
maintaining specific coverage targets was key to in-
creasing managers’ promotion prospects. For example,
in Xinyuan County, the coverage target level was set
at 80%. The responsibility to achieve and maintain this
level lay with the lowest administrative level (village
committee and township government) [42]. Therefore, the
township governments and villagers’ committees were
strongly encouraged and incentivized to mobilize the
population for enrolment.
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“I could mobilize a team of 50 community workers
and 80 village cadres to induce farmers and herders
to join the NCMS and to ensure the enrolment
percentage target. (An interview with an officer who
was responsible for health work in one township
government explained cited from a literature) [41].
The earmarking of central transfers as matching funds
based on enrolment rate was another important incen-
tive for local governments to expand coverage. The pub-
lic subsidies for NCMS come from central, provincial
and local government. The subsidies of different levels
of government were allocated in accordance with the
number of individual participants, and the central gov-
ernment’s matching subsidies would only be transferred
when the local government’s subsidies were in place.
Under this mechanism, it was reported that there was
no need to set specific targets for the enrolment rate of
each province, however local governments would set
they own contextually-relevant targets [40].
In order to strengthen local governments’ capacity for
designing and implementing the NCMS, it was reported
that an expert team was created to help guide counties’
NCMS design and pilots, to develop training materials
and carry out training for local government officers and
NCMS managers [11].
Accountable and transparent
Good governance requires that all relevant actors are
held publicly accountable, and transparency is required
as a critical step of promoting accountability [4].
CMS
In the CMS’s design, there were particular arrangements
seeking to ensure that CMS managers were accountable
to the local CMS enrolees. Firstly, during the implemen-
tation process, the central government never required a
compulsory enforcement of the CMS nor that a unified
design is implemented throughout the whole country.
The central government encouraged the local authorities
to adapt the CMS design to the local situation [27]. This
arrangement sought to ensure that the design of the
CMS was better suited to the local context and respon-
sive to the needs of local residents.
Notably, some of the initial policy documents on the
CMS design, providing more detailed regulation on fund
management emphasised the need for local accountabil-
ity. For example, in the “CMS Regulations of Masheng
County”, it was stated that the “CMS fund is managed in
the appointed account by the commune credit coopera-
tive, which is responsible for supervising how village
clinics using the fund. Village clinics should report their
fund use situation to CMS enrolees.” [26] The same
document also notes the requirement that meeting of
representatives of the CMS enrolees should be held each
year, and the participants had the right to check the fi-
nancial situation of the CMS. However, there is a lack of
documents illustrating how this kind of regulation was
implemented in practice. According to one source, how-
ever, there were cases of CMS funds being diverted to
other purposes or commune managers using their privil-
ege to buy expensive medicines [43]. It is unclear if this
was a frequent occurrence.
NCMS
Similarly to the CMS, for the NCMS the central govern-
ment only decreed the content of the policy and the
principal requirements for its functioning, as a general
strategic framework. The specific design on the key ele-
ments of the scheme, including the level of subsidy, the
extent of the benefits package, co-payment level, were
left to the discretion of the local governments [40]. The
NCMS management committee at county level was
composed of representatives from different government
departments and rural residents’ representatives, and
this committee directed and coordinated the operation
of the NCMS [24]. Howwever, the NCMS differed from
CMS in important ways. The NCMS had much stricter
regulations with regard to the management and alloca-
tion of funds compared with the CMS. According to the
regulation, the income and expenditures of the NCMS
funds were made through an earmarked account, and
there were unscheduled inspections of fund manage-
ment by auditing or finance departments [24]. Given
these systems in place, there was no reports on diverting
NCMS funds to other purposes. The transparency of the
NCMS fund income, expenditure, and reimbursement
processes was also required by national and local man-
agement regulations. These practices were critical and
contributed to the rapid expansion of the NCMS be-
cause the transparency and public information on the
fund management and allocation improved the confi-
dence of rural residents in the safety of their premiums.
However, there was almost not information in the docu-
ments included in this analysis on how the NCMS
acheived clear and transparent arrangements at the local
level, what specific designs may have helped to improve
accountability, for example on the appointment of health
providers and the contents of the benefit package.
One paper analysed the features of the NCMS design
which may have improved its accountability at the local
level. Given the voluntary enrolment, participants were
able to decide whether the system met their specific
needs or not. Administrators, therefore, had to convince
participants of the effectiveness and efficiency of the
system and improve their motivation to enrol through
ensuring a high quality service [39, 41]. Given the ar-
rangement that the earmarked subsidies of different level
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governments being based on the actual enrolment rate,
residents’ willingness to join and pay for the NCMS be-
came vital for sustaining the funding of scheme. There-
fore, voluntary enrolment combined with earmarked
central transfers as matching funds formed a local feed-
back loop to improve the accountability of local NCMS
managers to rural residents in their areas.
Intelligence and oversight
A supportive governance system is expected to draw on
intelligence and evidence generated throughout the process
of policy formulation, implementation and a constant cycle
of impact evaluation and redesign [4].
CMS
The earliest design of the CMS was derived from the
practice of grassroots communities and residents, but
not based on evidence. The emergence of CMS was the
result of the development of the Chinese cooperative
economy [36, 44] with the government acting to build
on locally socio-economic relationships.
“The appearance of CMS was the natural. With the
development of a collective economy, the agriculture
cooperative started to input funds to village clinics; at
the same time doctors and rural residents also started
to input some funds into village clinics. In exchange,
the rural residents could enjoy free consultation in the
clinics.” (an interview with Zhang Zikuan, a policy
maker experiencing the development of CMS)
However, during the process of scheme development,
the government sought to collect information, obtain
and reflect on evidence on experiences of implementa-
tion across China. Carrying out field investigations in
different geographical areas and learning from the prac-
tices piloted by local governments was a commonly used
mechanism by the Chinese government to collect and
use intelligence to inform policy making. CMS attracted
the attention of high level policymakers in the short
period after its establishment in 1955. The first step of
the central government was to send the vice-minister of
the Ministry of Health to visit Gaoping County and in-
vestigate CMS implementation. Even in the period from
1962 to 1968, when the development of CMS slowed
down, the field investigations and proactive sharing of
experience continued. In 1966, the vice minister of the
Ministry of Health led a team to investigate the CMS in
the Macheng Hubei Province where CMS had continued
to develop. After a detailed investigation and participant
observation, two reports analysed the implementation
specificity of CMS in these areas and the accumulated
evidence was disseminated to many actors and used ef-
fectively to inform the next round of rapid development
of CMS [10]. At the same time, no evidence of interest
in learning from international experience was found.
“After two investigative visits, it was confirmed that
CMS initially achieved early prevention of illness,
early treatment after getting illness, low cost, and
convenient utilization of health services, based on
which the decision was made to promote the success
of the CMS to the whole country.(an interview with
Zhang Zikuan, a policy maker experiencing the
development of CMS) [31]
“At that time, the field investigation was different from
now. We lived in the home of farmers for two or three
months, and observed the real situation on how CMS
worked and its influences on peasants.” (an interview
with Zhang Zekuan, the team member of this time
investigation)
NCMS
The 1980s and 2000s saw proliferation of research, with
many more studies on China’s rural health insurance
and health inequities being undertaken. The research
helped to accumulate the evidence base required for the
initiation and continued refinement of the NCMS policy
design. For example, a study supported by the Asian De-
velopment Bank (ADB) and co-sponsored by the State
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), and a
policy briefing paper which introduced the findings
brought to the attention of the to country Premier and
Chairman that “family bankruptcies due to medical ex-
penses accounted for a third of the rural poverty.” [23].
At the end of the 1980s, two studies, conducted by
Anhui Medical University and Ministry of Health, com-
pared CMS and the user fee-based model, and con-
cluded that the CMS could help to improve health care
unitization and health status compared with the user fee
model [23, 45, 46]. The research studies achieved an im-
pact throuogh placing the need for insurance on the pol-
icy agenda and demonstrating to the top leaders in
China the need to rebuild China’s health insurance sys-
tem in rural areas.
Other studies piloted and evaluated different policy
designs. From 1986-1990, the project “Health insurance
experiment in rural China” supported by the World
Bank piloted alternatives to the CMS design, including
premiums being 1-2% of household income, risk pooling
at the township level, household enrolment, and main
coverage of inpatient services, all of which directly con-
tributed to the design of NCMS [47]. From 1992, the
State Council China initiated a study on the feasibility of
the re-introduction of the CMS, and in this study, the
government piloted re-build of CMS in 14 counties in
seven provinces [20]. The key contribution of the study,
was that it piloted the government subsidy for premiums
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and concluded the necessity of government financial
support for the new CMS. Another contribution of this
project was that it encouraged more provinces to start
their own pilots of new style of CMS. Since 1996, 19
provinces also started their CMS pilots involving re-
search and evaluation. At the same period, there were
several other projects which also confirmed that a new
type of CMS was not feasible without government finan-
cial support. For example, in project “Strengthening
basic health services in poor rural areas of China”, a
Department for International Development (DFID) UK
inputted fund to simulate the government subsidy [48].
In 2003, when the NCMS was formally launched by
central government, pilots were also a crucial part of the
implementation process. In the technical guidance docu-
ment issued by the central government, there was no
detailed design specifying the contents of scheme (pre-
miums rate, provider payment mechanism, benefit pack-
age, etc.); but it was required that provinces need to
select at least two to three counties to pilot their
schemes prior to full-scale implementation. There was
the expectation that the pilots will be evaluated, and any
policy scale-up to all counties drawing on the evaluation
outcomes. From 2003 to 2005, NCMS pilots were con-
ducted in approximately 300 counties; and in 2006 a
large-scale evaluation of already implemented NCMS
was conducted [49]. All these pilots and evaluations
helped to inform the final design of NCMS [10, 11].
“The many efforts to re-establish a social health financing
scheme in rural areas during the 1990s provided very
useful lessons for policy makers.” (an interview with the
NCMS office director, cited in another study) [30]
Collaboration and coalition building
Health system governance also involves process of co-
ordination, collaboration and coalition building. Under a
well-governed system, the government and non-state ac-
tors, working in the health sector and in other sectors
relevant to health, are kept connected and jointly sup-
port the identifying of policy objectives, as well as gener-
ation and implementation of public policies addressing
these [3].
CMS
No information demonstrating collaboration between
different departments during the process of CMS design
and implementation was identified in the review.
NCMS
The review found that the discordance among policies
issued by different government departments may have
impeded the rebuilding of the CMS in 1990s. Though
Ministry of Health planned to collect premiums from
rural residents for rebuilding the CMS, Ministry of Agri-
culture did not allow to add additional fees to the tax
burden of the farmers [30].
In the early 2000s, given the high priority of rebuilding
of NCMS on the national development agenda, the pol-
icies and actions of different government departments
became increasingly more coordinated. In addition to
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Civil Affairs also
strongly supported the development of the NCMS [10],
because Ministry of Civil Affairs was also aware of the
acute problem of impoverishment caused by illness in
rural China. In 2003, the key NCMS launch and guid-
ance document “Opinions on establishing a new rural
cooperative medical system” was jointly issued by the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the
Ministry of Finance. Notably, the process of NCMS’
planning and implementation, a broader diversity of
social actors, for example, academic researchers, took
important roles in the process of NCMS design as
discussed above.
“In 1991, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture,
National Committee of Family Planning, National
Committee of Education, and the Ministry of Personnel
ever jointly issued a letter to the State Council “Asking
for reforming and strengthening health work in rural
areas”, in which they jointly asked for the re-building of
health insurance schemes in rural areas.”(An case cited
from a literature) [10]
Discussion
Key findings: what does governance mean for strengthening
the rural health insurance in China
This study reviewed and analysed the process of design-
ing and implementing two insurance schemes in rural
China, compared the governance practices underlying
these processes, and their fit with the criteria for good
governance. We identified a number of supportive
governance practices common to the two schemes,
including central government prioritising health sys-
tem development; the specific health financing pol-
icies being also recognised as key within national
development agenda; strong political will for promot-
ing the policies drawing on the advantages of the highly
hierarchical administrative system in China; local gov-
ernment autonomy in adoption of policy initiatives
responding to local conditions but operating within
the remit of a national policy framework; accumulat-
ing evidence generated from local experience to sup-
port policy making across China.
However, policy aspects and practices under some
governance domains also suffered from considerable de-
ficiencies. The national framework design for CMS was
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insufficiently comprehensive and systematic. Implement-
ing CMS in some areas did not involve a corresponding
adjustment in the management and organizational struc-
tures, and was managed by multi-purpose departments
administering a heavy load of local programmes and ini-
tiatives. In contrast, the NCMS benefited by a newly
established dedicated department to manage the funds,
which ensured tighter management and accountability.
Corruption and inefficient use of CMS funds was re-
ported at places, with these occurrences less common
under the NCMS. Importantly, collaboration between
different government departments in the process of rural
health insurance system development was often lacking
and the discordance between policies introduced by dif-
ferent departments and sectors represented an obstacle
to health insurance system strengthening in China.
The study demonstrated clearly how effective govern-
ance practices contributed to policy innovation and suc-
cessful implementation. CMS and NCMS differed in
terms of their origins, conceptualisation and initiation.
CMS is a community-based health insurance stemming
from China’s grassroots practices and collective econ-
omy, with policy makers in China becoming aware of its
potential as a suitable policy option to reduce barriers to
health care, and quickly seizing the opportunity to advo-
cate and promote it. NCMS, in contrast, is a government-
led scheme from its design and planning stage. However,
both schemes were rapidly scaled up nationally. An im-
portant supportive factor common to both schemes was
that the health system development was considered a pri-
ority on the country’s development agenda in the two time
periods when the schemes were being institutionalised.
The central government showed a substantial commit-
ment to the development of the two policies, including
political commitment for both schemes, and an added
strong financial commitment for the NCMS. The high-
level endorsement by key decision makers provided the
basis for different departments designing flexible policies
relevant to the local context, and was especially important
for the rapid uptake of the insurance schemes across
China. This signalling was particularly important in China
where the political system is hierarchical and dominated
by policy elites, and high level decision makers have con-
siderable power and discretion with regard to setting stra-
tegic directions [23], investing in far-reaching initiatives
with little consultation, and selecting local government
officers with stake in implementation.
The issuing of decrees and regulations by the central
government and assigning operational tasks to lower
levels of governments were key mechanisms for imple-
menting the CMS and NCMS nationally. However, the
critical factors facilitating effective policy implementa-
tion were the strong commitment of the central govern-
ment and the range of concrete and visible steps
undertaken to ensure that this commitment is translated
into action. For example, the directives issued by Mao
Zedong played key role in expanding the coverage of the
CMS, especially the requirement that the highest leader
of local government should take charge of the CMS
work, ensuring a local buy-in. The NCMS was also led
by highest government officers at the different levels of
government; at the same time, the effective roll-out of
the NCMS and its coverage and management, became
important performance indicators against which local
governments were appraised. It could be argued that
the presence of effective regulations and incentives to
enforce the health policies and pursue faster implemen-
tation reflected the central government’s commitment
and prioritisation of these policies, and this may have
helped to build quicker the implementation capacity.
This stewardship role for implementing large-scale ini-
tiatives may be more important in the more hierarch-
ical health systems.
For both CMS and NCMS, the central government
provided clear technical guidance, fundamental princi-
ples and requirements for the schemes’ design. However
there was never a ‘one size fits all’ policy in China im-
posed on the implementers, which may be feature of
policy development in countries with vast territory and
multi-level administrative divisions. Seeking to facilitate
the adoption of schemes aligned with the local context,
the local governments were allowed considerable auton-
omy and encouraged modification of the policy design
within the framework of the national requirements. The
autonomy also functioned as an incentive for the local
governments to actively pursue the implementation of new,
potentially high-risk policies, since the well-performing pi-
lots or successful policy uptake usually resulted in recogni-
tion and reward by the central government. Autonomy was
accompanied by the above mentioned practice, i.e. scheme’s
implementation and performance being set as an important
indicator for assessing local government capability. This led
to a feedback loop motivating the local governments to
pursue policy innovation while at the same time contribut-
ing to national strategy development.
Another challenge in health system strengthening was
the limited intelligence available to support policy design
and adaptation of policies, for example the low interest
to and uptake of lessons from other countries because of
the limited linkages and supportive political context in
China. Decision-makers sought to accumulate evidence
from local practices implemented in different parts of
the country including grassroots experiences with the
CMS, generated through field visits and research, with
their findings becoming the basis of influential policy
guidance documents that were then disseminated na-
tionally. The NCMS’s final policy design drew on a large
number of studies and evaluations of policy pilots in
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many counties. This practice may have promoted the
adoption of policy innovation and effective implementa-
tion in three ways: through the mobilization of intellec-
tual resources at all administrative levels to design the
policy; the central government’s recognition of local
areas’ exploration and variations in the policy may have
acted as an incentive for the local government to pursue
a more appropriate policy design; and thirdly, the policy
design was continuously refined considering that practices
inside country would be more acceptable to different sec-
tors and to different contexts, therefore accelerating and
facilitating versatile implementation.
The analysis highlighted the importance of collabor-
ation and coalition as markers of good governance in
the policy process of roll-out CMS and NCMS in China.
During the CMS period, there was no evidence that
departments collaborated in the process of policy imple-
mentation; moreover, a lack of consensus among differ-
ent departments impeded the rebuilding of CMS even
over a relatively long period. Conversely, the initiating of
NCMS was characterised by a higher level of collabor-
ation which was achieved under the coordination of the
central government and facilitated by a strong leadership
by the Ministry of Health. Collaboration across different
government departments has been a traditional bottle-
neck in China’s health system, because despite its hier-
archical health system, national governance is still often
fragmented, with the decision-making power dispersed
in different governmental departments having powers in
relation to key functions, including the technical support
and supervision, financial support decision, and personnel
management; with vertical lines of management and ac-
countability [11]. In this system, the political interests dif-
fer among various interests groups and departments, and
they must compete for political and economic resources
[50]. This kind of adversarial national governance system
is not conducive to easily reaching consensus and
undertaking coordinated actions among departments
and sectors, towards a common goal.
Comparisons with other studies
There are a large number of studies on CMS and NCMS
in China, and most have focused on policy design, cover-
age and their impacts on service accessibility and finan-
cial protection [9, 12, 13]. There are several studies
analysing the policy process underlying the two schemes.
Zhang [11] applied the concept of complex adaptive sys-
tems in analysing how rural health system developed
given the rapidly changing context in China. Wang [10]
analysed the development of the rural health care finan-
cing system as the process adopted by key policy makers,
of continually learning from new practices and adopting
to changed environments. Several other studies analysed
specific aspects of the policy process, for example, how
pilots of NCMS were conducted [20], how research im-
pacted on policy making in NCMS [22], or how a
district-designed and implemented local NCMS [40, 42].
Studies analysing overall health system in China also
concluded that the institutional structures, political pro-
cesses and procedures underpinning specific health pol-
icies may be more important as to why these policies were
seen to work, rather than their design as such [51, 52],
however these studies did not sufficiently explore the
significance of governance for policy effectiveness.
This paper sought to address this gap by applying a
dedicated governance and leadership framework to iden-
tify the specific governance factors and practices which
supported the appropriate design and effective imple-
mentation of two health insurance schemes. The infor-
mation search and extraction followed a rigorous search
strategy and relied on a transparent screening process.
We synthesized information on the design and imple-
mentation process of CMS and NCMS based on six do-
mains of health system governance, with the broad
concept of governance operationalised into specific sub-
domains and questions, and these were used to structure
and analyse the key emerging themes. In the process of
matching of data and themes to the different governance
domains, classifying the governance practices related to
the CMS and NCMS policy formulation and implemen-
tation, to the specific governance functions was critical.
During the analytical process, it became apparent that
the same practices can be classified under different gov-
ernance functions and subdomains. For example, Chair
Mao Zedong’s personal influence on CMS’s implementa-
tion can be seen as an expression of strong policy will
and pertaining to ‘policy vision and guidance’; while it
can also be relevant to ‘regulation’ because his endorse-
ment of the policy, from the position of a top leader,
may have accelerated the implementation of regulations
enacted at national level. These discrepancies were dis-
cussed within the team, and in collaboration with senior
researchers in China, and the final classification was
cross-examined through regular contact with the inter-
national project experts with experience of governance
analysis in other settings. The findings of the review
were also validated by senior researchers and policy
makers who were involved in the implementation
process of CMS or NCMS.
Policy implications
The political move towards universal coverage as a
major health system goal has led many low- and middle-
income countries to initiate reform or improve their
health financing system to expand the breadth and depth
of population coverage. Expanding health insurance
coverage to rural areas or the informal sector has often
been an important element of such strategies. China
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established the CMS and NCMS in different historical
stages, and both schemes contributed to an improved
access to health services, reduction of disease and allevi-
ation of the financial burden for rural residents. Cru-
cially, CMS and NCMS are seen internationally as
examples of policy innovations that were rapidly scaled
up to achieve near universal coverage. At the same time,
a number of low-income countries have faced consider-
able challenges in achieving major improvements in
coverage and extending basic financial protection to
their disadvantaged populations despite long term efforts
[53, 54]. This study demonstrated that health systems
governance may be a critical underpinning mechanism
that enables policy innovation, strategic development ap-
propriate to sub-national contexts, and effective imple-
mentation through a consistent policy cycle of piloting,
implementing on a large scale, learning lessons and
readjusting policies.
Our analysis suggests that large-scale initiatives to ex-
pand health insurance coverage to rural, informal and
marginalised population should understand and address
not only constraints related to financing arrangements
and organisational capacity but also identify what good
practices need to be enacted in each governance domain
to support the development of such schemes. As dis-
cussed above, the experience of China in implementing
the CMS and NCMS may provide a range of useful les-
sons. At the policy design stage, encouraging sub-national
governments to pilot diverse policy options, accumulate
evidence and disseminate experiences from local practice,
and compare these with areas with different characteris-
tics, could help to test and identify a range of policy op-
tions which fit with local health systems, and are feasible
and acceptable to different stakeholder, including those
beyond the health system. Clear accountability lines and
relationships can help to synthesise local experience and
ensure it shapes strategies owned at national level. At the
stage of scaling up schemes nationally, leadership by
national institutions through enacting regulations and
setting policy goals and targets to sub-national govern-
ment authorities and assessing policy implementation as
evaluation of local government performance can offer
leverage. A caveat is that this maybe more applicable to
systems that tend to be more hierarchical, although it
should be noted that China combines centralised decision
making with considerable autonomy at the province level.
The critical point is that the central government should
explicitly define the priority of key health policies, in this
case health insurance schemes for the rural populations,
within the overall national development agenda which is
usually contested by multiple actors in LMICs. Achieving
this is the basis for effective planning and implementation
of large-scale policy initiatives to expand health care
coverage. Many of the features of the Chinese health
financing reform are compatible with the definitions of
good governance referred to in this paper. Governance
appears to be a cross-cutting building block enabling
developments across other areas of the health system.
There are indications that fostering good governance
through attention to policies and actions in relation
to all its domains, can enable LMICs implementing
ambitious government-led financing initiatives to ac-
celerate progress.
Conclusions
China’s success in achieving scale up of CMS and NCMS
has attracted considerable interest in many low and middle
income countries, especially with regard to the schemes’
designs, coverage, and their impacts on services accessibil-
ity and financial protection. However, this study demon-
strates that health systems governance may be critical to
enable the planning, design and implementation of such
schemes. Given that many LMICs are expanding health
financing system to cover populations in rural areas or the
informal sectors, we argue that strengthening specific
practices in each governance domain could inform the
adaptation of China experiences in rural health insurance
system strengthening to other settings.
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